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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

the Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh properly allowed the railroads to assert a
compulsory counterclaim for property damages against an FELA claimant. "2
By allowing the railroads to maintain the counterclaim for property
damages, the Fourth Circuit in Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Ry. Co.
protected the common-law right of an employer to sue his employee for
damages resulting from the employee's negligence." 3 Since the plaintiff in

Cavanaugh could still recover on his claim for personal injury damages
under the FELA, the Fourth Circuit's protection of an employer's right to
sue his employee for property damages did not negate the remedial purpose

of the FELA." 4 The FELA does not hold railroads strictly liable for injuries
to railroad employees, but only holds railroads liable for injuries to railroad

employees that result from the railroad's negligence. "' In the future, FELA

claimants in the Fourth Circuit will continue to recover for their injuries at
the hands of negligent railroads, but they may also be held liable for property

damages resulting from their own negligence.
DANA JAMEs BOLTON

IX.

TRUSTS AND ESTATES

Citizenship of an Administrator Determinativefor
Diversity Jurisdictionin Personal Injury Action
Against the Estate

A federal court may obtain jurisdiction over a law suit if the parties to
that suit are of diverse citizenship and the suit involves a request for damages
in excess of ten thousand dollars.' A federal court determines diversity of
112. See supra notes 50-111 and accompanying text (analysis of why FELA does not bar
railroad's compulsory counterclaim for property damages against FELA claimant).
113. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing common-law right of employer
to sue his employee for damages resulting from employee's negligence).
114. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982) (railroad liable for injury or death of employee resulting
from negligence of railroad): supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (railroad counterclaim
for property damages will not exempt railroad from FELA liability).
115. See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982). The FELA only holds railroads liable for injuries to
railroad employees that result from the railroads' negligence. Id.

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982). Section 1332(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code
provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
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citizenship by examining the citizenship of each party to a suit to ensure that

no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as any defendant. 2 A court may
encounter difficulty in determining whether the parties are of diverse citizenship, however, when one of the parties to a suit is the administrator of an
estate.3 When an administrator is a party to a suit, the court must decide
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state
(3) citizens of different states and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of
a State or of different States.
Id. Federal diversity jurisdiction grew, in part, out of concerns of local bias by state courts
directed at out-of-state parties. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch)

61, 87-88 (1809); see also 13 C.

WRIGHT,

A.

MILLER,

& E.

COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

§ 3601, at 574 (1975) (diversity jurisdiction enacted to avoid prejudice to out-ofstate litigants). Diversity jurisdiction also provides the parties with a choice of forum. See
Rubin, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone, 70 A.B.A.J. 16, 16 (June 1984) (diversity jurisdiction
allows litigant to choose forum based on procedure of jurisdiction, judicial quality and docket
pace).
Today, many scholars advocate the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. See Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: The Silver Lining, 66 A.B.A.J. 177, 177-80 (1980) (diversity
jurisdiction should be abolished); McFarland, Diversity Jurisdiction:Is Local PrejudiceFeared?,
7 LITIGATION 38, 38 (Fall 1980) (arguments favoring abolition of diversity jurisdiction have
PROCEDURE

great weight);

WRIGHT AND MILLER,

supra, at 583 (arguments for abolishing diversity jurisdic-

tion). One scholar has argued that diversity jurisdiction crowds federal dockets. See Rubin,
supra, at 18. According to Rubin, the elimination of diversity jurisdiction would reduce the
federal judiciary budget greatly. Id. Contra Frank, An Idea Whose Time Is Still Here, 70
A.B.A.J. 17, 18 (June 1984) (federal dockets are crowded but solution is to improve procedures,
add judges and reduce number of questions decided). Other scholars argue that the historical
basis of diversity jurisdiction of preventing bias to out-of-staters is no longer valid in modern
society. See Phillips, Diversity Jurisdiction:ProblemsAnd A Possible Solution, 14 U. ToL. L.
REV. 747, 752 (1983) (prejudice against out-of-state litigants no longer a factor in state courts).
In general, those opposed to diversity jurisdiction state that interstate cooperation has abolished
the need to protect out-of-state litigants from potential bias in state court. See Bratton, Diversity
Jurisdiction-AnIdea Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347, 347-49 (1976) (today's interstate
society eliminates need for diversity jurisdiction).
2. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806); see Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978) (Constitution and Congress grant jurisdictional
power to federal courts). The Supreme Court opinion in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v.
Kroger states that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Id. at 374. As courts of
limited jurisdiction, federal courts must follow the limits placed by the Constitution or Congress.
Id. Complete diversity, however, is not a constitutional requirement. See State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (complete diversity not constitutionally
mandated). Congress has mandated, however, that diversity jurisdiction does not exist unless
each plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states. See Owen, 437 U.S. at 373-74
(federal diversity statute requires complete diversity of citizenship); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982)
(courts have jurisdiction over cases between citizens of different states); supranote 1 (discussion
of § 1332).
3. See Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1972) (federal court must determine
real party in interest to decide whether citizenship of administrator or citizenship of beneficiaries
controls diversity of citizenship in wrongful death action); Comment, Miller v. Perry: Further
Complications in Determining Diversity Jurisdiction, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 282, 294-95
(1973) (discussion of Miller indicating that both the administrator and beneficiaries play role in
determination of diversity jurisdiction).
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who is the real party in interest to determine whether to use the citizenship
of the administrator or the citizenship of the beneficiaries for purposes of
diversity of citizenship. 4 In a wrongful death action, the general rule is that
the administrator of the decedent's estate is the plaintiff real party in interest
and the administrator's citizenship is determinative for the purpose of
diversity of citizenship.' A personal injury action against an estate, however,
6
involves the appointment of an administrator as a defendant in a lawsuit.
4. See C. WlsTrrr, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 70 (3d ed. 1976) (real party in interest is
person possessing right to be enforced); see also Messer v. American Gems, Inc., 612 F.2d
1367, 1374 (4th Cir.) (beneficiaries had substantive interest in wrongful death action while
administrator had no stake in litigation), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); Sadler v. New
Hanover Memorial Hosp., 588 F.2d 914, 917 (4th Cir. 1978) (executrix was real party in interest
because appointed in will and had substantial duties to perform for estate); Mullins v. Seals,
562 F.2d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1977) (court looked to citizenship of beneficiaries for purposes of
diversity of citizenship because beneficiaries were real parties in interest); Vaughan v. Southern
Ry. Co., 542 F.2d 641, 644 (4th Cir. 1976) (administrator had no stake in outcome of wrongful
death action so beneficiaries' citizenship determined diversity of citizenship); Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 295 (4th Cir.) (administrator had no stake in outcome of wrongful death
litigation so not real party in interest), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); Miller v. Perry, 456
F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1972) (where administrator's duties in wrongful death action limited by
state, citizenship of beneficiaries' controls for diversity of citizenship); Lester v. McFaddon,
415 F.2d 1101, 1106 (4th Cir. 1969) (beneficiaries' citizenship controls for purposes of diversity
of citizenship).
5. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 186 (1931). The Mecom court
held the administrator is the real party in interest because the administrator is responsible for
conducting or settling the suit, distributing proceeds of the suit and responsible to act with due
diligence and fidelity. Id. While Mecom is the general rule concerning wrongful death administrators, an exception to the general rule exists for collusive appointment of the administrator
in violation of § 1359 of Title 28 of the United States Code. See Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d
289, 297 (4th Cir.) (administrator collusively appointed so beneficiaries' citizenship determined
diversity of citizenship), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974); see also Kramer v. Carribean Mills,
Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 830 (1969) (banning collusive manufacture of diversity jurisdiction); 28
U.S.C. § 1359 (1982) (federal courts have no jurisdiction when diversity collusively manufactured); infra note 42 (discussion of § 1359 ban on manufactured diversity jurisdiction). Section
1359 provides that district courts have no jurisdiction over civil actions where the invocation of
jurisdiction was improper or collusive. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982); see Kramer, 394 U.S. at 830
(no diversity exists with collusive manufacture of diversity jurisdiction); Miller v. Perry, 456
F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1972) (Mecom tempered by 28 U.S.C. § 1359 bar on collusive joinder);
see also Comment, Manufacturing Diversity Jurisdiction, 14 VIL. L. REv. 727, 741-43 (1969)
(discussion of § 1359 ban against collusive manufacture of jurisdiction by assignment). Another
exception to the Mecom general rule of looking to the administrator's citizenship for diversity
exists when the administrator has no real stake in the outcome of the litigation and the
beneficiaries, therefore, are the real parties in interest. See Messer v. American Gems, Inc., 612
F.2d 1367, 1374 (4th Cir.) (administrator appointed solely to satisfy statute and administrator
had no stake in outcome of litigation), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); Mullins v. Seals, 562
F.2d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1977) (beneficiaries are real parties in interest in wrongful death action
where administrator appointed merely to institute action); Vaughan v. Southern Ry. Co., 542
F.2d 641, 644 (4th Cir. 1976) (administrator of wrongful death action appointed solely to bring
suit is not real party in interest); Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1972) (courts look
to citizenship of beneficiaries for diversity purposes when administrator has no real stake in
outcome of litigation).
6. See VA. CODE § 64.1-75.1 (1980) (statute requires appointment of administrator to
defend action against estate required in Virginia).
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The law is less clear in defendant administrator cases about whether the
citizenship of the beneficiaries or the citizenship of the administrator controls. 7 In Krier-Hawthornev. Beam,' the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit decided to use the citizenship of the defendant estate
administrator rather than the citizenship of the estate beneficiaries to determine whether diversity of citizenship existed in a personal injury action
against the estate. 9
The controversy in Krier-Hawthorne originated with an automobile
accident in York County, Virginia. 0 A car driven by Joseph Krier, a New
York citizen, collided with a car driven by Thomas Beam, an Indiana citizen."I
The accident resulted in the death of Joseph Krier and serious injury to
Krier's wife, Margaret Krier-Hawthorne, a passenger in the Krier automobile. 12 Mrs. Krier-Hawthorne, a New York citizen, filed a diversity negligence
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
against Beam and against the estate of her husband. 13 Pursuant to Virginia
law, the Krier estate appointed a Virginia citizen, L. Wallace Sink, to be
administrator. 4 The beneficiaries of the Krier estate consisted of Mrs. KrierHawthorne, a New York citizen, a son who was a New York citizen, and a
daughter, who was a citizen of the State of Washington.' 5 Sink promptly
moved to dismiss the action for lack of diversity of citizenship, claiming that
the citizenship of the beneficiaries controlled the determination of diversity
and that diversity was absent because the plaintiff and a beneficiary of the
decedent's estate were both New York citizens. 16 The plaintiff argued that
the citizenship of the administrator and not the beneficiary controlled and,
therefore, diversity of citizenship existed.' 7 The district court agreed with the
defendant administrator and looked to the citizenship of the beneficiaries
for the purpose of determining diversity of citizenship.' 8 On appeal, the
7. Krier-Hawthornev. Beam, 728 F.2d 658, 661 (4th Cir. 1984).
8. 728 F.2d 658 (4th Cir. 1984).
9. Id. at 662.
10. Id. at 658.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 659.
13. See Hawthorne v. Beam, 558 F. Supp. 694, 695 (E.D. Va. 1983).
14. 728 F.2d at 659; see VA. CODE § 26-59 (Supp. 1984); id. § 64.1-75.1 (Supp. 1983)
(requiring Virginia resident administrator to represent Virginia estate of nonresident). Section
26-59 of the Code of Virginia forbids the appointment of a nonresident administrator to
represent an estate unless a Virginia resident administrator acts as cofiduciary. VA. CODE § 2659 (Supp. 1984). Section 64.1-75.1 of the Code of Virginia requires the appointment of an
administrator to represent the estate of any nonresident killed within or without the state when
a cause of action arises in Virginia. VA. CODE § 64.1-75.1 (Supp. 1983); see Note, Right of a
Nonresident To Qualify and Serve in Fiduciary Capacities-AnAnalysis, 37 VA. L. REv. 1119,
1121-24 (1951) (discussion of requirements of residency necessary to act as estate administrator
throughout United States).
15. Brief for Appellant at 4, Krier-Hawthorne v. Beam, 728 F.2d 658 (4th Cir. 1984).
16. Hawthorne v. Beam, 558 F. Supp. 694, 695 (E.D. Va. 1983).
17. Id. at 695-96.
18. Id. at 697. The Hawthorne district court dismissed the action for lack of diversity of
citizenship and for lack of an adversarial relationship between the estate heirs and the estate
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Fourth Circuit vacated the district court ruling and remanded the case to the

district court, stating that the citizenship of an administrator is determinative
for the purpose of determining diversity of citizenship in a personal injury
action against an estate when the estate administrator is a defendant.'

9

In deciding that the administrator's citizenship determines diversity of
citizenship in a personal injury action against an estate, the Krier-Hawthorne
court focused on the holding in Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.,20 a

United States Supreme Court benchmark case. 21 Mecom held that the citizenship of an estate administrator controls for the purpose of determining

diversity of citizenship. 2 In Mecom, the plaintiff's decedent died of injuries

sustained due to the alleged negligence of the defendant.Y The decedent's
widow, an Oklahoma citizen qualified as administratrix of her husband's
estate and brought a wrongful death action in an Oklahoma state court
against the Louisiana defendant.u The defendant promptly removed the case
administrator. Id. In contrast, the Krier-Hawthornecourt reasoned that an adversarial relationship existed between the widow and the administrator because Virginia had abolished interspousal
immunity. 728 F.2d at 660. The Fourth Circuit also noted that Virginia law required the
appointment of a Virginia administrator so the widow had no choice in the matter. Id.
19. 728 F.2d at 662. In determining that the citizenship of the administrator controls for
diversity of citizenship in a personal injury action against the estate, the Krier-Hawthornecourt
noted that Virginia had abolished interspousal immunity in automobile accident litigation. Id.
at 659; see Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 194, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1971) (abolishing
interspousal immunity in Virginia). Interspousal immunity was common law notion that a
husband and wife are but "one flesh" and cannot sue each other. See Surratt, 212 Va. at 192,
183 S.E.2d at 201. In Surratt, Cornelia Surratt was a passenger in an automobile driven by her
husband when the Surratt vehicle collided with an automobile driven by a third person. Id. at
192, 183 S.E.2d at 201. Mrs. Surratt died as a result of the collision and her administrator
brought a wrongful death action against her husband and the driver of the other car. Id. at
192, 183 S.E.2d at 201. The husband filed a demurrer based on interspousal immunity. Id. at
192, 183 S.E.2d at 201. The Surratt court determined that the old common law notion of
considering the husband and wife as "one flesh" was no longer tenable. Id. at 194, 183 S.E.2d
at 202. The Surratt court then abolished interspousal immunity and emphasized that the ruling
applied only to personal injuries resulting from automobile accidents. Id. The Virginia Supreme
Court expanded the reach of Surratt in Korman v. Carpenter. See Korman v. Carpenter, 216
Va. 86, 92, 216 S.E.2d 195, 198 (1975). In Korman the court expanded the abolition of
interspousal immunity to cover an action for wrongful death where the wrongful act of one
spouse results in the death of the other spouse. Id. at 91-92, 216 S.E.2d at 198. The Korman
abolition of interspousal immunity applies only when the deceased spouse dies without living
children or grandchildren. Id. at 91-92, 216 S.E.2d at 198. The Virginia Supreme Court,
however, has refused to extend the abolition of interspousal immunity to intentional torts
committed by one spouse upon another spouse when the action is brought after divorce. See
Courts v. Counts, 221 Va. 151, 266 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1980); see also Smith v. Kauffman, 212
Va. 181, 186, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971) (Virginia Supreme Court abrogated the rule of parental
immunity in automobile accident litigation); Taylor, A Re-examination of Sovereign Tort
Immunity in Virginia, 15 U. RicH. L. Rav. 247, 252 (1981) (discussion of abolition of
interspousal immunity in Virginia).
20. 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
21. 728 F.2d at 660-61.
22. Mecom, 284 U.S. at 190.
23. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 47 F:2d 28, 28 (10th Cir.), rev'd, 284 U.S. 183
(1931).
24. Mecom, 284 U.S. at 184-85.
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to the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on
the basis of diversity of citizenship between the parties.2 5 To avoid diversity
jurisdiction, the administratrix voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice. 26 Subsequently, the administratrix brought identical wrongful death
suits in an Oklahoma state court two additional times. 27 Each time, the
defendant removed the suit to federal court based on the diversity and the
28
administratrix voluntarily dismissed the actions.
After three unsuccessful attempts to bring suit in state court, the widow
in Mecom finally resigned from her administratrix position and induced the
Oklahoma probate court to appoint a Louisiand citizen as administrator to
avoid diversity jurisdiction. 29 The Louisiana administrator appointed the
widow as co-administrator in Oklahoma whereupon the widow brought suit
again in Oklahoma state court.30 Again the defendant removed the suit to
federal court based on diversity of citizenship. 31 The administrator moved to
remand the case to Oklahoma state court on the ground of lack of diversity
because both the plaintiff administrator and the defendant were Louisiana
citizens. 32 The United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma denied the motion and held that the widow was the real party in
interest so that her citizenship controlled diversity of citizenship.3 3 The Tenth
34
Circuit affirmed the district court ruling.
Upon reviewing the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Mecom, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Tenth Circuit. 35 The
Supreme Court asserted that the motive for appointing an administrator to
avoid diversity jurisdiction was immaterial 36 and that the administrator was
the real party in interest.3 7 The Mecom Court noted that the administrator
was the real party in interest because Oklahoma law required the appointment
of an administrator to prosecute the action and prescribed the administrator's
duties. 38 The Supreme Court stated that because the administrator was the
25. Id. at 185.

26. Id. at 184-85. In Mecom, the plaintiff dismissed the case without prejudice. Id.
Dismissal without prejudice leaves the case as if no action had been filed. Id.; see 9 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 2367, at 185-86 (dismissal without prejudice permits
filing of second action).
27. Mecom, 284 U.S. at 184-85.
28. Id.

29. Id. at 185.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 47 F.2d 28, 29 (10th Cir.), rev'd, 284 U.S. 183

(1931).
33. Id.

34. Id. at 31. The Tenth Circuit in Mecom reasoned that the administrator was merely a
nominal party and that the out-of-state administrator's appointment was purely to escape the
jurisdiction of the court. Id. at 30.
35. Mecom, 284 U.S. at 183, 186, 190.
36. Id. at 189. The Mecom Court concluded that once a probate court officially appointed
an administrator, no court should attack collaterally the appointment in examining diversity of
citizenship. Id.
37. See id. at 190.

38. Id. at 186, 190.
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real party in interest, the administrator's citizenship controlled the determination of diversity of citizenship.3 9
In discussing Mecom, the Krier-Hawthorne court noted that Mecom
represents the settled proposition that federal courts have jurisdiction over
suits by or against administrators as long as the administrator's citizenship
is diverse from the opposing party's citizenship. 40 However, the Fourth
Circuit observed that section 1359 of Title 28 of the United States Code4'
tempers Mecom by prohibiting "collusive or improper" manufacture of
diversity. 42 The section 1359 prohibition against collusion prohibits a party
43
from choosing his opponent based solely on a desire to establish diversity.
The Krier-Hawthorne court concluded that the appointment of Sink as
resident administrator was not a collusive violation of section 1359 because
Virginia law required appointment of a resident administrator."

39. Id.
40. 728 F.2d at 660.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982) (prohibition against collusive manufacture of diversity
jurisdiction); see supra note 5 (discussion of § 1359).
42. 728 F.2d at 660.
43. Id.; see Kramer v. Carribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 826 (1969) (§ 1359 ban on
collusive manufacture of diversity limits diversity jurisdiction). In Kramer, Carribean Mills, a
Haitian corporation, entered into a contract with a Panamanian corporation to purchase
corporate stock of the Panamanian corporation. Id. at 824. The Haitian corporation defaulted
and the Panamanian corporation assigned the contract to Kramer, a Texas lawyer. Id. Kramer
brought a suit on the contract against Carribean Mills in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas claiming diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Id. Carribean Mills
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and the district court denied the motion. See Carribean
Mills Inc. v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387, 388 (5th Cir. 1968). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the assignment was improper and collusive under 28 U.S.C. §
1359 and, therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 394. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Fifth Circuit and concluded that the assignment was improperly collusive. 394
U.S. at 830. The Kramer Court, however, asserted that several differences exist between the
appointment of an administrator and the assignment of a cause of action. Id. at 828 n.9. First,
the Court noted that statutes often require the appointment of an administrator for the
prosecution of a suit and that administrators owe 4heir appointment to a state probate court
decree. Id. Second, the Kramer Court noted that administrators possess discrete powers. Id. A
third distinction between assignment and appointment of an administrator is that the assignor
can bring suit without the assignee and the act of assignment is a totally voluntary act between
the parties. Id. After noting the differences between appointment of an administrator and
assignment of a cause of action, the Kramer Court declined to decide whether the distinctions
between appointment of an administrator and assignment of a cause of action are significant
under 28 U.S.C. § 1359. See id.; see also Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63, 65 (4th Cir. 1972)
(Kramer holding requiring an examination of administrator's duties in examining diversity of
citizenship undermined the Mecom assumption that administrator was real part in interest);
Comment, Manufacturing Diversity Jurisdiction, 14 ViLL. L. REv. 727, 742 (1969) (Kramer
prohibition against manufacturing diversity jurisdiction serves to limit Mecom holding recognizing administrators as real parties in interest); Comment, Miller v. Perry: FurtherComplications in Determining Diversity Jurisdiction, 30 WAsH. L. REv. 282, 286 (1973) (Kramer ban on
collusive manufacture of jurisdiction limited Mecom rule indicating that administrator's citizenship determines diversity of citizenship).
44. 728 F.2d at 661.
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In addition to the determination that the appointment of the administra-

tor in Krier-Hawthorne was not collusive, the Krier-Hawthorne court noted
that the Fourth Circuit had developed an exception to the Mecom rule

recognizing the administrator as the real party in interest.4 5 According to the
Krier-Hawthornecourt, the exception to Mecom states that the beneficiaries

are the real parties in interest in wrongful death actions when there is a
plaintiff administrator and two factors are present.4 The first factor the
Fourth Circuit noted was that state wrongful death statutes designate bene-

ficiaries who are the real party plaintiffs in interest even though not formally

named as plaintiffs.47 Second, the Fourth Circuit stated that the plaintiff
administrator of an estate in a wrongful death action has no assets to
administer in connection with the litigation and no real stake in the outcome
of the litigation. 48 The Krier-Hawthornecourt acknowledged that in wrongful
death actions, where the plaintiff administrator has no stake in the litigation
and the beneficiaries are the real the real parties in interest, the beneficiaries'
citizenship controls for diversity of citizenship. 49 The Fourth Circuit observed,

however, that Krier-Hawthornewas a case of first impression for the Fourth
Circuit because Krier-Hawthornewas the first Fourth Circuit case to involve
a defendant administrator appointed in a personal injury action in accordance
with state law. 5 0 Previous Fourth Circuit diversity cases involving adminis-

45. Id. at 660.
46. Id. at 660. The Krier-Hawthornecourt noted that the Fourth Circuit had considered
wrongful death actions involving a determination of diversity of citizenship with a plaintiff
administrator seven times since Mecom. Id. The Fourth Circuit observed that in six of the seven
previous cases, the fourth Circuit determined that the beneficiaries' citizenship controlled
diversity of citizenship. Id.; see Messer v. American Gems, Inc., 612 F.2d 1367, 1374 (4th Cir.)
(beneficiaries' citizenship controls for diversity of citizenship in wrongful death action because
administrator has no stake in litigation), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); Mullins v. Seals,
562 F.2d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1977) (if administrator appointed merely to bring wrongful death
suit then beneficiaries' citizenship controls for diversity of citizenship); Vaughan v. Southern
Ry. Co., 542 F.2d 641, 643 -(4th Cir. 1976) (administrator appointed to invoke diversity
jurisdiction so beneficiaries are real parties in interest); Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 29596 (4th Cir.) (beneficiaries' citizenship determinative for diversity of citizenship in wrongful
death on behalf of estate because administrator's duties are merely nominal), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1056 (1974); Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1972) (in wrongful death action
against estate, administrator's duties are limited and beneficiaries are real parties in interest);
Lester v. McFadden, 415 U.S. 1101, 1105 (4th Cir. 1969) (estate beneficiaries had real stake in
outcome of wrongful death action on behalf of estate and citizenship of beneficiaries controlled
for diversity of citizenship). But see Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 588 F.2d 914,
917 (4th Cir. 1978) (administrator's citizenship controls for diversity purposes where will
appointed administrator and administrator had substantial duties).
47. 728 F.2d at 660; see VA. CODE § 8.01-53 (1984) (Virginia wrongful death statute
designating beneficiaries). The Virginia wrongful death statute defines the wrongful death
beneficiaries to be the surviving spouse, children and children of deceased children of the
decedent. Id. If no spouse or children exist, the statute directs that the decedent's parents,
brothers and sisters become the beneficiaries of the wrongful death action. Id.
48. 728 F.2d at 660.
49. Id. at 660.
50. Id. at 661.
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trators concerned only plaintiff administrators prosecuting wrongful death
actions.'
The Fourth Circuit declined, therefore, to follow the rule established in
prior diversity cases involving plaintiff administrators, and turned instead to
52
the Mecom holding that the administrator was the real party in interest.
The Fourth Circuit held that the administrator's citizenship controlled in a
personal injury action against ihe estate for determining diversity of citizenship for several reasons.53 First, the Fourth Circuit stated that the estate
beneficiaries, in their role as such, had no stake in the outcome of the
personal injury suit against the estate.5 4 Although Mrs. Krier-Hawthorne was
a beneficiary of the estate, her stake in the outcome of the litigation derived
from her plaintiff status and not her beneficiary status. The Krier-Hawthorne
court noted that a successful suit by the plaintiff would neither enrich nor
impoverish the beneficiaries because an automobile liability insurance policy
provided the proceeds to pay any damage award.5 5 The Krier-Hawthorne
court reasoned that the beneficiaries could not be the real parties in interest
without having a stake in the outcome of the suit.5 6 Second, the Fourth
Circuit stated that the appointment of Sink as administrator was not collusive
because state law required the appointment of a resident administrator.5 7 The
Fourth Circuit asserted that the plaintiff could file suit in Virginia since
Virginia was the situs of the accident.58 The fact that the plaintiff did not
manufacture diversity jurisdiction, therefore, provided further support for
not departing from the Mecom rule.5 9 Finally, the Krier-Hawthorne court
found the duties of the administrator to be substantial as opposed to the
nominal duties of a wrongful death administrator. 60 Since the duties of the
administrator were substantial, the Fourth Circuit observed that the administrator was the real party in interest. 6' The Fourth Circuit concluded by
observing that the justifications for departing from Mecom, as enunciated
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

55. Id. at 661. The Krier-Hawthornecourt noted that the beneficiaries had no stake in
the outcome of the litigation because the decedent's automobile insurance policy would pay any
judgment against the estate. Id. at 661. The Krier estate had no assets other than the insurance
policy and therefore the beneficiaries would neither be enriched nor impoverished by the
outcome of the litigation. Id.
56. Id.

57. Id.; see VA. CODE § 26-59 (Supp. 1983); id § 64.1-75.1 (1980). (Virginia ancillary
administrator required to defend action against estate prosecuted in Virginia); supra note 14
(discussion of §§ 26-59 and 64.1-75.1 of Virginia Code).
58. 728 F.2d at 661.
59. See id.
60. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Krier-Hawthornedetermined that the decedent's automobile
insurance policy was an asset of the Krier estate available to satisfy specific claims against the
policy. Id. at 660. According to the Krier-Hawthornecourt, the administrator's duties included
administration of the insurance asset. Id. at 661. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit noted that
the administrator's responsibilities included notifying the insurance company of the action,
defending the litigation, and a general fiduciary duty to act with due diligence. Id. at 661-62.
61. Id.
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Circuit wrongful death actions, were not present in
in the previous Fourth
62
Krier-Hawthorne.
In contrast to the majority ruling that the administrator's citizenship
controls diversity of citizenship in a personal injury action against the estate,
the Krier-Hawthornedissent asserted that the administrator was not the real
party in interest. 6 The dissent, however, agreed with the majority's assertion
that the estate beneficiaries were not the real parties in interest because the
beneficiaries had no stake in the litigation. 64 Rather than considering the
beneficiaries or the administrator to be the real parties in interest, the dissent
instead suggested that the automobile liability insurance company was the
real party in interest because the insurance company had a direct and
substantial financial stake in the outcome of the litigation. 6 The dissent
likened the insurance company's stake in the suit to a direct action6 against
the insurance company and concluded that the insurance company's citizenship should control diversity of citizenship. 67 Finally, the Krier-Hawthorne
dissent advocated adoption of an American Law Institute (ALI) proposal
which would impute the decedent's citizenship to the administrator of an
estate for purposes of diversity of citizenship. 68 The dissent asserted that
adoption of the ALI proposal would defeat diversity in Krier-Hawthorne
69
because both the plaintiff and defendant decedent were New York citizens.
The Krier-Hawthorne majority properly determined that the citizenship
of an administrator controls in a personal injury diversity suit against an
estate. 70 The circuits generally agree that the Mecom ruling, indicating that
the administrator is the real party in interest in an action involving an estate,
is still binding precedent. 7' A real party in interest is one who possesses the
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 662; see supra note 46 (explanation of the Fourth Circuit exceptions to Mecom).
Id. at 665 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 664-65 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 668 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
Id.; see 12A G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:784 (2d ed. 1981). A

"direct action" suit against an insurer is a suit by an injured person or representative of an
injured person directly against the insurer. Id. At common law, as well as today, the absence
of a statute expressly allowing direct actions bars the right of anindividual to maintain a direct
action. Id. § 45:785. Virginia has no direct action statute. Krier-Hawthorne v. Beam, 728 F.2d
658, 668 (4th Cir. 1984) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). Section 38.1-380 of the Code of Virginia
provides that the only time an individual may bring a direct action in Virginia is when a
judgment obtained against the insured remains unsatisfied. VA. CODE § 38.1-380 (1950).
67. 728 F.2d at 668 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 671 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see AmERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1301(b)(4) (1969) (proposal
to use citizenship of decedent in diversity action); 728 F.2d at 661 n* (Krier-Hawthornemajority
acknowledged that the use of decedent's citizenship was ideal proposal but Congress had not
adopted proposal); see also infra notes 107-110 and accompanying text (discussion of ALI
proposal to apply decedent's citizenship to estate in action by or against estate).
69. 728 F.2d at 672 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
70. See 728 F.2d at 662; infra text accompanying note 79 & 89 (indicating that Fourth

Circuit properly determined Krier-Hawthorne).
71. See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1983) (general rule is that
citizenship of representative determined diversity of citizenship), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1281
(1984); Field v. Volkswagenwerk AG., 626 F.2d 293, 302 (3d Cir. 1980) (generally administrator's
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substantive right contested in the litigation. 72 Mecom considered an administrator the real party in interest because an administrator is required to
bring suit under state statute, is charged for the conduct or settlement of the
suit, and has a fiduciary duty to the estate. 73 Several exceptions to Mecom,

however, exist. 74
First, section 1359 of the United States Code prohibits the collusive
manufacture of diversity jurisdiction. 75 The ban against collusively manufac-

tured jurisdiction is grounded in the idea that federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction. 76 For a federal court to have diversity jurisdiction, the

parties must be properly before the court. 77 An example of improper diversity

jurisdiction would be a case involving a defendant, a decedent and beneficiaries all of like citizenship and the appointment of an out-of-state administrator solely to create diversity of citizenship. 78 In Krier-Hawthorne,however,
citizenship controls for diversity of citizenship); Betar v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd.,
603 F.2d 30, 33 (7th Cir. 1979) (rule that administrator's citizenship determines diversity of
citizenship valid but tempered by § 1359 ban on collusive jurisdiction), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1098 (1980); Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp., 588 F.2d 914, 915 (4th Cir. 1978) (Mecom
rule recognizing administrator as real party in interest still valid precedent).
72. See Prevor-Mayorsohn Carribean v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, 620 F.2d 1, 4
(Ist Cir. 1980) (real party in interest is one with substantive right); 6 C. WRIGHT AND A.
MILLER, supra note I § 1541 (person with substantive right is real party in interest); FED. R.
Civ. P. 17 (A) (all federal action shall be prosecuted in name of real party in interest); see also
Comment, Federal Courts-Diversity Jurisdiction-When State Law Requires Wrongful Death
Action to Be Prosecuted By Resident Ancillary Administrator, Citizenship of Beneficiaries is
Controlling For Diversity Purposes-Miller v. Perry, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 801, 805-06 (1972)
(discussion of real party in interest with administrator). See generally Kennedy, Federal Rule
17(a): Will The Real Party in Interest Please Stand?, 51 MINN. L. Rav. 675, 678 (1967)
(discussion of federal real party in interest rule).
73. See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 186 (1931).
74. See 728 F.2d at 660-661; infra notes 78 and 80-84 and accompanying text (discussion
of Fourth Circuit exceptions to Mecom).
75. Id. at 660; see 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982) (ban against collusive manufacture of diversity
jurisdiction).
76. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co., v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) (federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction); Kramer v. Carribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823, 825 (1969)
(discussion of § 1359 ban on collusively creating diversity jurisdiction); supra note 2 (federal
courts entitled only to limited jurisdiction).
77. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (requirement for diversity jurisdiction in federal courts);
28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982) (ban on collusively or improperly created diversity jurisdiction).
78. See Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 296-97 (4th Cir.) (administrator appointed
collusively to manufacture diversity jurisdiction), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974). In Bishop,
a South Carolina resident died when his automobile collided with another South Carolina
resident in South Carolina. Id. at 290. The estate beneficiaries of the decedent obtained the
appointment of a Georgia administrator from a South Carolina probate court. Id. The
administrator brought a wrongful death action in the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina and the defendant moved to dismiss the action for lack of diversity.
Id. The defendant alleged that the appointment of the Georgia administrator was solely to
manufacture diversity jurisdiction. Id. The district court agreed that the appointment was
collusive and dismissed the action. Id. at 291. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court
decision by stating that the sole purpose of the appointment of an out-of-state administrator
was to create diversity jurisdiction and that motive was collusive in violation of federal law. Id.
at 296-97; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982) (ban against collusive manufacture of diversity).
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the Fourth Circuit correctly noted that appointment of Sink as administrator
was not collusive as the appointment was made solely to comply with Virginia
law.

79

A second exception to Mecom that the Krier-Hawthornecourt examined
in determining diversity of citizenship was the "substantial stake" test
developed by the Fourth Circuit. 0 The "substantial stake" test examines the

extent of the duties performed by the administrator of the estate to see if
the administrator's duties are substantial or nominal.8' If the duties of the

administrator are not substantial, the Fourth Circuit utilizes the citizenship
of the beneficiaries for purposes of diversity of citizenship. 8 2 The "substantial
stake" test stems from the idea that a party cannot be a real party in interest

83
without a substantial stake in the outcome of the litigation. In applying the

"substantial stake" test to wrongful death cases with a plaintiff administra-

79. 728 F.2d at 661.
80. Id., see infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text (explaining "substantial stake" test);
see also Messer v. American Gems, Inc., 612 F.2d 1367, 1374 (4th Cir.) (plaintiff administrator
had not stake in the outcome of the litigation and was not real party in interest), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 956 (1980); Mullins v. Seals, 562 F.2d 326, 327 (4th Cir. 1977) (administrator appointed
merely to prosecute wrongful death action was not real party in interest); Vaughan v. Southern
Ry. Co., 542 F.2d 641, 644 (4th Cir. 1976) (administrator needs "substantial stake" in outcome
of litigation to be real party in interest).
81. See 728 F.2d at 660-62 (explanation of "substantial stake" test); see also Bianca v.
Parke-Davis Pharmaceutical Div., 723 F.2d 392, 396-98 (5th Cir. 1984) (Fifth Circuit interpretation of Fourth Circuit's "substantial stake" test); Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir.
1972) (Court should examine administrator's duties in wrongful death action to see if substantial
or nominal for purposes of diversity of citizenship); 14 C. Wuorr, A. MILER, & E. COOPER,
supra note 1, § 3640 (discussion of Fourth Circuit's "substantial stake" test).
82. See 728 F.2d at 63; 14 C. WRuoIrr, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note I § 3640
(beneficiaries are real parties in interest where administrator's duties are nominal); see also
Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63, 63 (4th Cir. 1972) (administrator must have substantial stake in
litigation to be real party in interest). In Miller, a Florida infant died due to the alleged
negligence of the North Carolina defendants. 456 F.2d at 63. North Carolina law required that
a local administrator bring a wrongful death action. Id. at 64. The decedent's father, a Florida
citizen, could not qualify as administrator so the decedent's grandfather, a North Carolina
citizen, acted as administrator and filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina. Id. at 63-64. The district court held that the administrator was the
real party in interest and dismissed the action for the lack of diversity jurisdiction. Miller v.
Perry, 307 F. Supp. 633, 637 (E.D.N.C. 1969). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that diversity
existed because the Florida beneficiaries were the real parties in interest and the beneficiaries'
citizenship determined diversity. Miller, 456 F.2d at 68. The Miller court determined that the
Mecom Court's recognition of the administrator as the real party in interest was not an inflexible
doctrine. Id. at 65. The Fourth Circuit asserted that the responsibilities of the Miller administrator were not important and because those duties were insubstantial the citizenship of the
beneficiary controlled diversity. Id.; see Comment, Federal Jurisdiction-Citizenshipof the
Beneficiaries Controls in Wrongful Death Actions Requiring A Resident Administrator, 51
N.C.L. REv. 639, 646 (1973) (asserting that Fourth Circuit decided Miller properly); Comment,
supra note 72, at 814 (indicating Miller decision contrary to Supreme Court precedent);
Comment, Miller v. Perry: Further Complications in Determining Diversity Jurisdiction, 30
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 282, 295 (1973) (Miller only serves to complicate common diversity
principles).
83. See 14 C. WRIoH, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 3640 (discussion of
"substantial stake" test).
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tor, the Fourth Circuit has ruled that the administrator of a wrongful death
action was a nominal party in six of seven previous cases, and therefore
utilized the beneficiaries' citizenship for diversity of citizenship rather than
84
the administrator's citizenship.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has criticized
the Fourth Circuit's "substantial stake" test."' The Fifth Circuit stated that
the "substantial stake" test was attractive because the test is easy to apply
and effectuates the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, but the Fifth Circuit
asserted that the "substantial stake" test cannot be justified under the
language of section 1359.86 The Fifth Circuit claimed that section 1359 only
allows a motive test to see if the administrator's appointment was intended
to manufacture diversity jurisdiction. 87 According to the Fifth Circuit, the
"substantial stake" test moves into an area reserved for Congress in dictating
the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. s8 Nevertheless, the Krier-Hawthorne court applied the Fourth Circuit's "substantial stake" test to find
that the administrator had a substantial stake in the personal injury action
against the estate and that the administrator's citizenship consequently should
control diversity of citizenship. s9 The Sixth and Tenth Circuits also have held
that an administrator who has a substantial stake can rely on his citizenship
for diversity purposes.9

84. See supra note 45 (discussion of seven previous Fourth Circuit administrator diversity
cases).
85. See Bianca v. Parke-Davis Pharmaceutical Div., 723 F.2d 392, 398 (5th Cir. 1984).
In Bianca, an eleven year old girl died of aplastic anemia from taking the Mississippi defendant's
cold medication. Id. at 394. The beneficiaries of the Bianca estate also were citizens of
Mississippi. Id. Because of the terrible trauma, the decedent's parents appointed the decedent's
aunt, of Louisiana, administratrix. Id. The administratrix filed a wrongful death action in the
United States District Court for the District of Mississippi. Id. The district court dismissed the
suit because the administratrix had no stake in the litigation and because the appointment was
collusive. Id. The Fifth Circuit reversed the Mississippi district court, holding that the motive
for appointment was pure and that with a pure motive, the administratrix's stake in the litigation
was relevant but not controlling. Id. at 398. The Bianca court ruled that the administratrix's
citizenship controlled for diversity of citizenship. Id.
86. Id. at 397-98; see 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1982) (prohibition against collusively manufacturing diversity jurisdiction); Frank, supra note 1, at 18 (discussion of positive aspects of
diversity jurisdiction).
87. Bianca, 723 F.2d at 397-98 (discussion of Fifth Circuit's motive test).
88. Id.
89. See 728 F.2d at 661-62.
90. See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1983) (receiver's citizenship
controlled for diversity of citizenship purposes where receiver had "substantial stake"), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1281 (1984); Hackney v. Newman Memorial Hosp., Inc., 621 F.2d 1069,
1071 (10th Cir.) (citizenship of administrator with substantial stake controlled for diversity of
citizenship), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 982 (1980). In Gross v. Hougland, the Delaware Court of
Chancery appointed Gross, a Delaware resident, to act as receiver for Hougland Barge Line,
Inc., a dissolved Delaware Corporation. Gross, 712 F.2d at 1035. Gross filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against four Kentucky citizens, who
were former shareholders, accountants or lawyers for Hougland, alleging negligence in liquidating the corporation. Id. at 1036. The defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of
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In applying the "substantial stake" test in a personal injury action
against an estate, a court must look to the duties performed by the defendant
administrator. 91 In the case in which an automobile insurance policy exists
to satisfy judgments, the insurance policy is an asset of the estate. 92 The
administrator's stake includes responsibility for administration of the insurance policy to see that an action covered by the policy is properly defended. 93
The administrator also coordinates the conduct or settlement of the suit with
the insurance company.9 4 Another factor in a personal injury action against
the estate is that, unlike a wrongful death action on behalf of the plaintiff
estate where the beneficiaries stand to gain by a successful suit, the beneficiaries of a fully insured defendant estate have no stake in the outcome of
the litigation. 95 In Krier-Hawthorne, therefore, the Fourth Circuit properly
diversity jurisdiction, alleging that the plaintiff manufactured the diversity. Id. The Kentucky
district court dismissed the action and the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court. Id. at 1036,
1041. The Sixth Circuit stated that policies limiting an administrator's or a guardian's ability
to rely on the administrator's or guardian's own citizenship apply with equal force to receivers.
Id. at 1038. The Sixth Circuit further stated that the appointment of the plaintiff in Gross was
not collusive because Delaware law required appointment of a Delaware receiver to prosecute
the action. Id. at 1039. The Gross court allowed use of the receiver's citizenship for diversity
of citizenship. Id.; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 279 (1953) (requires appointment of receiver
to manage corporate assets upon dissolution).
In Hackney v. Newman Memorial Hospital, Inc., the Tenth Circuit examined whether to
use the administrator's or beneficiaries' citizenship in a diversity action. Hackney, 621 F.2d at
1069-70. In Hackney, the plaintiff administratrix brought a wrongful death action on behalf of
her mother's estate against the defendant. Id. at 1069. Originally, the decedent's daughter,
Brenda Rea, an Oklahoma citizen, received appointment from an Oklahoma probate court to
act as administratrix. Id. Brenda Rea resigned as administratrix after completing all duties
except the prosecution of the wrongful death action. Id. The Oklahoma probate court then
appointed the decedent's other daughter, the current plaintiff and a Colorado citizen, as
administratrix for the wrongful death action. Id. The Oklahoma trial court dismissed the suit
and ruled that the appointment of the administratrix was a collusive attempt to create diversity
jurisdiction between the Colorado administratrix and the Oklahoma defendant. Id. at 1070. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit state& that Oklahoma law required that an administrator bring a
wrongful death action and distribute the resulting proceeds. Id. at 1071; see OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1053 (West 1961) (amended 1978 & 1979) (requiring appointment of administrator for
wrongful death action in Oklahoma). The Tenth Circuit also determined that the administratrix
received a portion of the proceeds of the wrongful death action so that the administratrix had
a substantial stake. Hackney, 621 F.2d at 1071. The Tenth Circuit then held that the citizenship
of the administratrix determined diversity of citizenship. Id.
91. See Sadler v. New Hanover Memorial Hosp.j 588 F.2d 914, 917 (4th Cir. 1978)
(Court should examine duties of administrator in determining diversity of citizenship).
92. See 728 F.2d at 660; Milmoe v. Toomey, 356 F.2d 793, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(automobile liability insurance policy is asset of estate of deceased).
93. See VA. CODE § 64.1-139 (1980) (personal representative responsible for administering
properly decedent's whole personal estate).
94. See id. (administrator has fiduciary duty to administer estate properly; see also Milmoe
v. Toomey, 356 F.2d 793, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (assets of estate include automobile liability
insurance policy); 13A G. COUCH, supra note 66, § 49:99 (notice of accident is condition
precedent to recovery).
95. See 728 F.2d at 661; see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (beneficiaries had
no stake in litigation).
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determined that the administrator was the real party in interest since the
administrator performed substantial duties and the beneficiaries had no stake
96
in the suit's outcome.

The Krier-Hawthornedissent offered an interesting alternative to considering the beneficiaries or the administrator as the real party in interest by
suggesting that the automobile liability insurance company was the real party

in interest. 97 According to the dissent, an insurance company has a direct
financial stake in the outcome of a suit against an insured and a personal
injury action against an estate is like a direct action against the insurer. 9

Several aspects of Virginia insurance law, however, point to a contrary
holding. 99 First, Virginia has no direct action statute that would allow an

individual to sue an insurance company directly on a policy claim. m00 Without

a direct action statute, the insurance company would not be a named party
to the suit and should not be considered the real party in interest.' 0' Second,

Virginia case law prohibits claimants from mentioning insurance on behalf
of the defendant in court. 0 2 If the existence of the insurance policy, and
therefore the insurer, cannot be mentioned in court, the insurer should not
be considered to be the real party in interest. 0 3 Third, in a personal injury
action against a living defendant, the insurance company's interest is not

considered so the insurer's interest should not be considered in a suit
involving an estate administrator.' 4 Fourth, the probate court charges the
estate administrator with administration of the insurance asset of the estate,
thereby presenting the administrator with a substantial duty to perform. 0 5
96. See id. at 662; supra note 91-95 and accompanying text (discussion of stake of
administrator and stake of beneficiaries in litigation).
97. Id. at 668 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
98. Id.; see infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text (discussion stake of insurance
company); supra note 65 (examining direct actions against insurers).
99. See infra notes 100-106 and accompanying text (discussion of insurance company's
stake).
100. 728 F.2d at 668 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting); see VA. CODE § 38.1-380 (1980) (direct
action against insurer in Virginia available only after a judgment against insured remains
unsatisfied); see also supra note 66 (discussion of direct action against insurers).
101. See 18 G. COUCH, supra note 66, § 74:542 (insurer not necessary party to litigation).
102. See e.g., Willard v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 213 Va. 481, 483, 193 S.E.2d
776, 778 (1973) (policy in Virginia is that plaintiffs must avoid mentioning the defendant's
insurance coverage in court to avoid prejudice or bias in case); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lobello,
212 Va. 534, 536, 186 S.E.2d 80, 82 (1972) (mentioning existence of defendant's insurance or
absence thereof at trial is reversible error); Rinehart & Dennis Co. v. Brown, 137 Va. 670, 675,
120 S.E. 269, 272 (1923) (evidence of insurance is irrelevant and inadmissible in personal injury
action).
103. See supra note 102 (cases addressing admissibility of insurance policy may support
conclusion that insurer should not be considered real party in interest).
104. See Willard v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 213 Va. 481, 483, 193 S.E.2d 776, 778
(1973) (plaintiff cannot mention auto insurance in suit between two individuals); 18 G. COUCH,
supra note 66, § 74:542 (2d ed. 1983) (when insurer indemnifies insured, insurer is not necessary
party to litigation).
105. See 728 F.2d at 661 (administration of insurance policy is substantial duty for
administrator); see also Isbell v. Flippen, 185 Va. 977, 978, 41 S.E.2d 31, 33 (1947) (duty of
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The combination of the four factors above presents a compelling reason to
use the citizenship of the administrator instead of the citizenship of the

insurer for diversity of citizenship, especially given the existing Mecom
holding that the administrator's citizenship is dispositive for diversity of
citizenship purposes.'

6

Perhaps the best alternative for determining the proper diversity party
in suits involving administrators is the ALI Proposal to use the decedent's

citizenship.10 7 Both the Krier-Hawthorne majority and dissent, as well as
other Fourth Circuit cases, cite the ALI proposal as ideal for resolution of
the problem of determining diversity of citizenship with an estate adminis-

trator involved. 10 Congress, however, defines jurisdiction for the federal

courts and Congress has not adopted the ALI proposal.'09 The ALI proposal,
therefore, was not available for the Krier-Hawthornecourt.10
The Fourth Circuit in Krier-Hawthorne properly concluded that the

citizenship of an estate administrator controls for diversity of citizenship in
a negligence action against the estate."' In determining that the administrator's citizenship controls, the Fourth Circuit correctly followed the existing
Supreme Court precedent set out in Mecom." 2 The Fourth Circuit also
administrator to collect and administer assets of estate was substantial; supra note 92 (automobile
policy is asset of estate).
106. See 284 U.S. 183, 186 (1931); see also supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text
(reasons for utilizing administrator's citizenship rather than insurer's in personal injury action
against estate).
107. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN

STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1301(b)(4) (1969) (proposing that courts use citizenship of
decedent for diversity of citizenship when personal representative brings action);see also Wright,
Restructuring FederalJurisdiction:The American Law Institute Proposals,26 WASH. & LEE L.
RV. 185, 196 (1969) (discussion of ALI proposals for substantive changes in diversity jurisdiction). See generally Field, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts-A Summary of American Law
Institute Proposals,46 F.R.D. 141 (1969) (summary of ALI proposals on diversity jurisdiction).
108. See 728 F.2d at 661 n*, 671 (noting that ALI proposal of using decedent's citizenship
in determining diversity of citizenship in action against estate may be ideal); Miller v. Perry,
456 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1972) (ALI proposal to use decedent's citizenship in action involving
estate is best solution for determining diversity of citizenship in action involving estate); Lester
v. McFaddon, 415 F.2d 1101, 1106 (4th Cir. 1969) (ALI has best solution to problem of
determining diversity jurisdiction when estate involved by deciding to use decedent's citizenship
in determining diversity of citizenship).
109. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1965)
(Supreme Court recognized that while ALI proposals may be best change must come from
Congress); Krier-Hawthorne,728 F.2d 658, 661 n* (4th Cir. 1984) (Congress has not approved
ALI proposal); Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir. 1983) (federal courts are of
limited jurisdiction and only have jurisdiction defined by constitution and granted by Congress).
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1281 (1984); Miller v. Perry, 456 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1972) (until
Congress enacts ALI proposal to use decedent's citizenship Fourth Circuit is limited to existing
law); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (describing jurisdiction granted to federal courts).
110. See supra note 109 (discussion of federal court jurisdiction).
111. See 728 F.2d at 662; supra notes 80 & 89 and accompanying text (examining Fourth
Circuit's determination in Krier-Hawthorne).
112. See 728 F.2d at 661 (administrator's citizenship controls for diversity of citizenship in
personal injury action against estate); see also Mecom, 284 U.S. at 186 (administrator is real
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properly noted that the existing exceptions to Mecom which prohibit collusive
manufacture of diversity jurisdiction and require that an administrator have
a substantial stake in the outcome of the litigation did not apply." 3 For
future litigants, Krier-Hawthorne indicates that the Fourth Circuit requires
an administrator to have a substantial stake in the litigation and that the
administrator not violate the section 1359 ban against the collusively manufactured jurisdiction regardless of whether the administrator is a defendant
or a plaintiff."4 Krier-Hawthorne illustrates, however, that the stake of the
administrator in a personal injury action against a fully insured estate is
likely to outweigh the stake of the beneficiaries to the estate."' Once a court
has determined that the administrator's citizenship controls diversity of
citizenship, the court must examine the citizenship of all remaining parties
to insure that complete diversity exists to obtain diversity jurisdiction over
6
the lawsuit."
STOICELY

G.
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party in interest in action involving estate); supra note 71 (several federal circuits agree with
Fourth Circuit that Mecom is valid precedent).
113. See Mecom, 284 U.S. at 186 (administrator's citizenship determined diversity of
citizenship); 728 F.2d at 661-62 (exceptions to Mecom requiring substantial stake for administrator and prohibiting collusively manufactured jurisdiction did not apply in Krier-Hawthorne);
supra notes 75 & 80-83 (exceptions to Mecom are for collusively manufactured jurisdiction and
lack of stake by administrator in outcome of litigation).
114. See 728 F.2d at 660-62.
115. See id. at 661; supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (discussion of administrator's
stake in litigation).
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (federal courts have jurisdiction over suits between
citizens of different states); supra note 1 (discussion of complete diversity requirement).

